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RACE, RISK AND REAL ESTATE:
THE FEDERAL HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK
HOMEOWNERSHIP IN THE POST
WORLD WAR II HOME OWNERSHIP STATE
AMANDA TILLOTSON
The existence of a property-owning majority in the United
States was the result of federal institutional intervention in the
period after World War II. This intervention both reduced the
risks assumed by mortgage lenders and changed the terms on
which mortgages were offered. By underwriting mortgages is-
sued by lending institutions, the Federal Housing Administra-
tion (FHA) made it possible for a larger share of working and
middle class individuals to own homes, but arguably exacer-
bated racial disparities: the property-owning majority that was
created in the period after World War 1I was white. There is
general agreement that FHA underwriting criteria played an im-
portant part in this story. Existing explanations for these crite-
ria focus on the FHA's incorporation of racialized criteria
developed by its predecessor, the Home Owners Loan Corpora-
tion, and on the role of political bargains made to secure the co-
operation of local officials and real estate interests.
In this paper, I suggest that an additional factor needs to be
considered. I connect these requirements to dominant under-
standings about the financial risks and variations in property
value associated with race. I argue that these understandings
were embedded in the national financial environment, and were
legitimized by the legal order. I suggest that FHA underwriting
requirements were shaped by the need to secure participation
by financial institutions and by the need to minimize risk to
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agency funds in a legal and financial environment characterized
by negative attributions about the connections among race, risk
and property values. The FHA codified and reframed existing
connections between race and risk, converting them into more
detailed, more apparently "objective" criteria that could be
operationalized in terms of measurable indicators that shaped
its underwriting decisions.
" In no country in the world is the love of prop-
erty more active and more anxious than in the
United States; nowhere does the majority display
less inclination for those principles which threaten
to alter, in whatever manner, the laws of prop-
erty." -Alexis deTocqueville, Democracy in
America,
INTRODUCTION: THE HOME OWNERSHIP STATE AND
THE CREATION OF RACIALIZED OWNERSHIP:
AN OVERVIEW
Alexis de Tocqueville's comment sums up a traditional narra-
tive of the historic role of home ownership in American life.
America, this story indicates, was from its foundation a nation
of property owners; the desire for ownership reflected a national
ideology that connected home ownership to independence. The
account incorporates a myth concerning historically high rates
of home ownership, connecting these to individual enterprise
and the individualist ethos demonstrated, for example, by Fred-
erick Jackson Turner's frontiersmen2 or Jeffersonian "yeoman
farmers." 3 An elaborated version, such as that contained in "It's
a Wonderful Life", emphasizes the relationship between pro-
spective home buyers and banks or thrifts willing to lend to fru-
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 154 (Vol. 2 1838).
2 FREDRICK J. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 51 (1921).
3 Judith I. Neufville & Stephen E. Barton, Myths and the Definition of Policy
Problems, 20 POL'Y SCI. 181, 186 (1987).
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gal working and lower-middle class individuals. In this version,
financial institutions and individual market virtues such as thrift
and hard work created opportunities for ownership. The idea
that disparate opportunities were provided based on race and
class is absent, and state action plays no role.
This narrative has been corrected by authors such as Katznel-
son, Massey and Denton4 who demonstrate that the actual his-
tory of American home ownership tells a different story.
Majority ownership, they point out, was a post-World War II
phenomenon that resulted from a major innovation in the way
property came to be owned: The transition was produced by the
visible hand of state action rather than the invisible hand of sup-
ply and demand.5 This visible hand operated primarily through
two programs: the Veteran's Home Loan Program (VA pro-
gram), which was laid out in Title III of Servicemen's Readjust-
ment Act of 1944 (Public Law 78-346) and the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) which was established by the Housing
Act of 1934. Both agencies guaranteed mortgages written by in-
stitutional lenders, reducing the risks to these lenders; both
these and other authors demonstrate increased ownership for
Whites while imposing criteria that restricted opportunities for
Black purchasers. 6
Data support the contention that state action in the era after
World War II created majority home ownership for Whites
while maintaining-and exacerbating-racial disparities in own-
ership rates. During the period from 1900 to 1940, home owner-
ship rates declined from 46.5 to 43.6%; the 1950 census was the
4 See IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UN-
TOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
113 (2006); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY &NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 204-05
(1993).
5 KATZNELSON, supra note 4, at 116, 138.
6 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL CENSUS OF HOUSING TA-
BLES OWNERSHIP RATES (2013), https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/
census/historic/ownrate.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2015)
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first to report that a majority-55%-of White Americans
owned homes. The comparable figure for Blacks was 34.5%. 7
This racial ownership gap was not new: double-digit disparities
in ownership had been documented by each census, beginning in
1900 when racial ownership rates began to be reported.8 The
tendency for Black and White rates to rise and fall in tandem,
while maintaining the racial gap, was also a constant in census
data. However, the gap expanded in the period after World War
II: Collins and Margo (2000) find that between 1940 and 1960,
ownership rates for Whites increased 24.2% as against 18.6%
for Blacks, but that the racial ownership gap increased by five
points during this period. 9 The racial disparity in home owner-
ship widened after the introduction of federal programs to ex-
pand access to home ownership.
While the racial ownership gap was longstanding, its persis-
tence and growth in the era after World War I was particularly
noteworthy for two reasons. First, housing values-particularly
in suburban areas-increased rapidly during this period, so that
racial differences in mortgage access had serious long-term ef-
fects on Blacks' ability to accumulate wealth. A number of anal-
yses have connected this historical circumstance to the large
current disparity between Black and White net worth.10
Second, federal policy and federal institutions had become the
principal source of home ownership opportunities. The state,
and specifically the racialized lending practices of the Veteran's
Administration and the FHA, rather than simply vague "market
forces" or societal prejudice were now implicated both in the
7 Id.
8 William J. Collins & Robert A. Margo, Race and Homeownership: A Cen-
tury-Long View 2 (Vanderbilt Univ. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No.00-
W12, 2000).
9 Id.
10 MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH, WHITE
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 101,107 (2d ed.
2006); see, e.g., THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN
AMERICAN: How WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 47-9 (2004).
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restriction of Black ownership and in the use of expanded own-
ership to produce a geographic division between White suburbs
characterized by well-maintained, owner-occupied housing and
densely-populated Black urban neighborhoods characterized by
rental housing interspersed with dilapidated, owner-occupied
properties.II
Both agencies engaged in practices that produced racialized
housing outcomes, although the target group for each agency
differed. The VA program extended housing opportunities to
veterans in order to reward their service and also to address the
shortage of housing for returning soldiers and their families.
However, the Black population eligible for this assistance was
restricted both by the VA's own criteria and by the fact that that
the World War II military imposed recruiting quotas for
Blacks. 12
The FHA, by contrast, underwrote mortgages without impos-
ing service requirements, drawing borrowers from a universe of
working and middle-class individuals who had been disadvan-
taged by existing methods of home finance. The population that
it ultimately advantaged was numerous and White: 98% of the
private mortgages issued between 1930 and 1950 were insured
by the FHA; only 2% of borrowers were non-White. 13 In this
paper, I focus on the development of racialized underwriting re-
11 See DAVID FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY: STATE POLICY AND WHITE
RACIAL POLITICS IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (2010); Marc Seitles, The Perpetu-
ation of Residential Racial Segregation in America: Historical Discrimination,
Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 89 (1996); CHARLES ABRAMS, THE HOUSING PROBLEM AND THE
NEGRO 1, 64-76 (1966); KENNETH JACKSON, THE CRABGRASS FRONTIER:
THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985).
12 Supra note 5, at 139-140.
13 Marc Seitles, The Perpetuation of Residential Racial Segregation in
America: Historical Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclu-
sionary Remedies, 14 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 89, 89 (1998-1999); see also,
BETH J. LIEF & SUSAN GOERING, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FEDERAL
MANDATE FOR FAIR HOUSING, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS: CHANGING
PATTERN OF RACIAL SEGREGATION 227, 229 (Gary A. Tobin ed., 1987).
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quirements by the FHA and offer a new perspective on the rea-
sons for these requirements. 14 I first explain the way in which
the FHA shifted the risks assumed by mortgage lenders and re-
structured mortgages to make them more accessible to working
and middle-class individuals. I next review the mechanisms
through which FHA lending requirements produced racially dis-
criminatory outcomes. I then discuss the role of financial and
legal understandings about the relationship of race, risk and
value. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the FHA's larger
role in legitimizing and reproducing racial disparities in access to
ownership.
THE FHA: SHIFTING RISKS AND
RESTRUCTURING MORTGAGES
The FHA aimed to improve access to home ownership for fi-
nancially responsible borrowers who purchased properties that
met its underwriting criteria. The Agency accomplished this by
insuring loans made by "banks, trust companies, personal fi-
nance companies, building and loan associations, installment
lending companies" and other approved financial institutions
that met these criteria.15 In a 1947 memo to the President's
Commission on Civil rights, Commission Secretary Robert Carr
noted that "[p]erhaps the most innovative principle of the legis-
lation [creating the FHA] was the insurance of housing loans
and mortgages against default in order to encourage lending in-
stitutions to make funds available in a very adverse housing
market." 16 Financial institutions could apply for loan guarantees
prior to mortgage approval or within one year afterward. 17
14 Kevin F. Gotham, Racialization and the State: The Housing Act of 1934
and the Creation of the Federal Housing Administration, 43 SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES, 291-317 (2000).
15 NAT'L HOUSING ACT OF 1934, PUB. No. 479 § 2, 48 STAT. 1246 (1934).
16 Robert K. Carr, Draft Memorandum on Housing and Civil Rights (June
28, 1947) (on file with the Truman Library, RG 201, Box 20).
17 Supra note 15, at 1247.
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These guarantees shifted the risk of bad loans from private fi-
nancial institutions to the public budget.
The FHA also required that these guaranteed loans incorpo-
rate terms that altered the traditional structure of newly-
originated mortgages to make them more accessible to working
and middle-class individuals.,8 FHA regulations required mort-
gages to contain specific terms. First, up to 80% of a maximum
principal of $16,000 could be financed, lowering down payment
requirements. Second, the mortgage could have a duration of no
more than 20 years. Third, interest rates could be no more than
6% a year. Fourth, because interest rates were to be no higher
than 6%, lowering prevailing rates by at least 2%. Finally, the
loan was required to be self-amortizing: That is, payments were
required to reduce principal as well as to cover interest.19
These terms represented a major change in the structure of
newly originated home mortgages. Before the state intervened
to reduce lenders' risks, mortgage terms severely restricted ac-
cess to home ownership. Borrowers were required to make very
high down payments - 50 to 80% of appraised value was typical
- and loans were made for very short time periods; five to seven
years were typical durations. Therefore, virtually all loans re-
quired refinancing. The 1931 Better Homes manual warned that
"[n]o mortgage on a home should be regarded as permanent, for
if there is a shortage of mortgage money when it falls due there
may be difficulty about renewing it."20 National bank mortgages
on urban property, which became available after 1916, were
made only for a one year term and required a 50% down pay-
18 RICHARD R. W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBOR-
HOOD: RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 108
(2013).
19 NAT'L HOUSING Act OF 1934, PUB. No. 479 § 203 (B)(4), 48 STAT. 1248
(1934).
20 John M. Gries & James S. Taylor, How to Own Your Home, in THE BET-
TER HOMES MANUAL 40 (Blanche Harbert ed., 1931).
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ment.21 Typical mortgages did not amortize, and therefore re-
quired large balloon payments or refinancing at the conclusion
of the loan period.22 Strict enforcement of these constraints was
produced by the fact that many mortgages were designed to be
resold to individual investors or to insurance trusts, both of
which had a very low tolerance for risk.23
Limits on financing were more stringent for Blacks. Lenders
typically required higher down payments and offered shorter
mortgages to these purchasers. In 1921, one lender explained to
the Chicago Commission on Race Relations "that the Negroes
are usually allowed $1,000 to the white man's $1,500; only 35 per
cent of the value of the property is loaned to the Negro, whereas
50 per cent is granted to whites. Maximum time of loan was five
years for the White and three years for the Negro." 24 The effects
of mortgage restriction on Black ownership opportunities were
magnified by the fact that Blacks were typically required to pay
higher prices to secure less desirable properties. Restrictive cov-
enants and the threat of violent White response limited Black
purchases to particular neighborhoods, lowering the supply of
homes and raising their prices.25 Negative attributions about the
credit-worthiness of Blacks both as earners and as consumers
meant that institutions and individuals were unwilling to
purchase Black mortgage notes. 26
These ex ante restrictions on lending grew out of the way in
which financial institutions assessed risks arising both from race
and from social class, dimensions that intersected one another.
21 Barabara Ballinger, Home Ownership in America, in Realtor Mag: The
Magazine of the National Association of Realtors (May 2008), http://realtor
mag.realtor.org/news-and-commentary/feature/article/2008/05/homeowner
ship-america.
22 CHI. COMM'N ON RACE RELATIONS, THE NEGRO IN CHICAGO: A STUDY
OF RACE RELATIONS AND A RACE RIOT 120 (2nd ed. 1923)
23 Id. at 114.
24 Id. at 130.
25 Id. at 120.
26 Supra note 22, at 119.
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Blacks were disproportionately represented in the lower and
lower-middle classes. They fell into a class that, ceteris paribus,
had faced difficulties in obtaining conventional financing from
thrifts, banks and savings and loans. With respect to race, how-
ever, all else was not equal. As I demonstrate below, for this
group, financial risks associated with class were amplified by as-
sessments of risks associated with race.
REDUCING MORTGAGE RISK: THE MECHANISMS
OF FHA DISCRIMINATION
Agency underwriting and real estate valuation practices have
been widely identified as a source of racial ownership dispari-
ties. 27 Neither the 1934 Housing Act nor FHA underwriting
regulations made specific reference to Blacks or to the racial or
ethnic characteristics of individual borrowers. In fact, require-
ments were worded to avoid references to Blacks, substituting
terms such as "inharmonious racial groups." 28 However, the re-
quirements that underwriting criteria established for properties
and for neighborhoods had disparate racial effects both through
their assessment of the value and insurability of individual
properties and through their appraisal of neighborhood suitabil-
ity. Housing policy expert Charles Abrams famously noted, in
terms of racial implications, early editions of the Agency Under-
writing Manual "read like a Chapter of Hitler's Nuremberg
Laws. " 2 9
27 KATZNELSON, supra note 4; see also, D.S. MASSEY & NANCY DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDER-
CLASS (1993).
28 This both disguised racial bias against Blacks and left open the possibility
that local prejudice against particular groups, such as Jews or Mexicans, could
be accommodated. Ethnic prejudice varied with localities: on the West coast,
or example, covenants often targeted "Mongolians," a racial term for Asians.
29 CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN
HOUSING 214 (1985).
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The management of risk arising from loan underwriting was
central to the FHA's mission. The 1936 Underwriting Manual
laid out this agenda, noting that "[m]ortgage risk is created
every time a mortgage is made. It lies in the future. The risk
continues to exist throughout the life of the loan, although the
degree of risk may change. It is fallacious to presume that mort-
gages fall into two classes viz., those that are safe and those that
are unsafe. Each and every mortgage investment is hazardous to
some degree. However, different mortgages vary as to degree of
risk." 30 The FHA's underwriting criteria aimed to manage risk
by applying actuarial principles to the mortgage underwriting
process. 3' As I demonstrate below, the indicators used to de-
velop these assessments operationalized prevailing social con-
structions about the relationship of race to risk, incorporating
the notion that race was a major dimension of variation in the
degree of mortgage risk.
The FHA Underwriting Manual rated risk in terms of four
general categories: Property, Borrower, Location and Mortgage
Pattern.32 To rate property risk, the Manual established physical
criteria for insurable homes. These criteria made detailed pre-
scriptions about amenities such as electrical outlets ("Suitable
outlets should be provided in adequate numbers in suitable loca-
tions to permit the convenient use of electrical appliances and
household electrical equipment").33 They established standards
for acceptable kitchens ("Kitchen should have adequate win-
dows and their placement is critical for natural ventilation")34
30 FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, UNDERWRITING AND VALUATION
PROCEDURE UNDER TITLE II OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT § 207 (1936).
31 Benjamin Allen Wiggens, Managing risk, Managing race: Racialized Actu-
arial Science in the United States, 1881-1948 (May 2013) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on file with Digital Conservancy,
University of Minnesota).
32 Supra note 30, at § 221.
33 FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, PROPERTY STANDARDS: REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR MORTGAGE INSURANCE UNDER TITLE II OF THE NATIONAL
HOUSING ACT § 209(a), 209(c) (1936).
34 Id. at § 203.
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and bathrooms ("Bathroom should be located conveniently to
the bedrooms").35 These standards were much more likely to be
met in the newly constructed suburbs that excluded Black pur-
chasers than in older urban neighborhoods. 36
Under the "Location" category, the Manual also used de-
tailed criteria to classify neighborhoods into A, B, C and D
levels based on their suitability for lending: neighborhoods rated
"A" received preference, while those ranked "D" typically did
not qualify for mortgages. Preference was given to neighbor-
hoods that met specific requirements for public infrastructure
that were less common in poor urban neighborhoods. The Man-
ual noted, for example, that "publically provided sewerage sys-
tems are strongly preferred." 37
A weighted eight-item scale detailed the importance assigned
to various factors in assessing locational suitability for mortgage
insurance, although judgments about the numerical score on
each indicator were subjective. These requirements were implic-
itly connected to racial characteristics. Forty percent of the de-
termination was to be based on the neighborhood's "relative
economic security", 20% from "protection from adverse influ-
ences," and 5% from "freedom from special hazards." 38 Blacks
were disproportionately represented among the lower-wage
earners who were most insecurely employed. The movement of
Blacks into an area was also viewed as a "special hazard" and an
"adverse circumstance" 39: the Manual noted, "a change in social
or racial occupancy generally leads to instability and a reduction
35 Id. at § 203(d).
36 See, e.g., DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: BLACK AMERICANS
AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 189-91 (1995).
37 Id. at § 207(f).
38 Kenneth Jackson, Race, Ethnicity and Real Estate Appraisal: The Home-
owners Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Authority, 6 J. URB.
HIST. 419, 435 (1980).
39 JAMES LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS: A HIDDEN DIMENSION OF AMERICAN
RACISM (2005).
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in values. ' 40 In order to assess the possibility of negative future
change, "property evaluators were to investigate the surround-
ing areas for the presence of 'incompatible racial and social
groups' and to assess whether the location might be 'invaded' or
'infiltrated' by 'inharmonious racial groups.' "41 Residential Se-
curity maps graphically described these neighborhood distinc-
tions, circling in red Black and racially mixed neighborhoods
that were ineligible for loans.42
The indicator scores determined by evaluators were summed
into a single figure that expressed the underwriting risk posed
by each proposed mortgage.43 This summation process was
weighted so that negative scores on particular components had
greater influence. Section 228 of the Manual noted, "[i]f the sum
of the individual feature ratings in any category is less than 50%,
this indicates a degree of risk too great to permit issuance of the
mortgage. ' 44 The cutoff had clear racial implications. In the
Property component, as I have noted above, indicators linked to
race-economic security, protection from adverse influences,
and special hazards-made up 65% of the total value, raising
the probability that the total score would not meet the mark in
Black neighborhoods. Additionally, the lowest-rated category
received the most weight in the final determination of
insurability .45
Racial covenants were the Agency's preferred method for
preventing neighborhood racial change and stabilizing property
values to reduce risk. The Manual noted, ". . deed restrictions
should be used as security against decline in desirability for resi-
dential purposes due to the encroachment of inharmonious ele-
ments. '4 6 Until it was revised in 1950, two years after the
40 Supra note 30, at § 233.
41 Supra note 18, at § 109.
42 Id. at § 212.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at § 233.
46 Supra note 33, at § 201(a).
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Supreme Court in Shelly v. Kraemer held that state action to
enforce restrictive covenants was unconstitutional, the Manual
provided a model covenant to be attached to the deeds of homes
in new developments. 47 Avoiding a specific reference to Blacks,
this covenant provided for "[p]rohibitions of the occupancy of
properties except by the race for which they are intended. ' 48
INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Why did these racially charged requirements become incorpo-
rated into FHA rating requirements? Given America's troubled
racial history, one broad but familiar answer seems obvious: "in-
stitutionalized racism." The analysis that I develop attempts to
unpack this explanation as it applies to the racialization of home
ownership. It does so by identifying specific mechanisms that
allowed racial discrimination to structure FHA efforts to expand
ownership. This, in turn, offers the possibility of connecting the
continued disparity between Black and White ownership to ear-
lier practices in a new way. The connection that I suggest is that
race had been constructed both by law and by financial institu-
tions as an independent source of risk and that FHA require-
ments incorporated, reproduced and further legitimized this
construction. In order to obtain the co-operation of lenders in
the FHA program, the Agency incorporated existing under-
standings of the financial risks associated with race. The Agency
itself also accepted these understandings, applying racial criteria
in order to reduce its own risks.
FHA loan guarantees were intended to increase access to
ownership specifically by reducing the risk to lending institu-
tions. Its underwriting requirements, as I have demonstrated,
provided a large advantage to White borrowers. One explana-
tion for these racialized underwriting requirements focuses on
what could be called institutional heritage, arguing that the
47 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US 1 (1948).
48 Supra note 33, at § 284(3).
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FHA simply adopted and extended the discriminatory policies
and practices of the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC),
which existed from 1933 to 1935. 49 The HOLC was created to
address the problem of mass foreclosure in the wake of the De-
pression. It did this by using public funds to purchase and refi-
nance mortgages in danger of foreclosure. Like the FHA, the
HOLC altered the structure of mortgages to provide borrowers
with more favorable terms, lowering interest rates and ex-
tending the duration of mortgages.50
The HOLC developed underwriting criteria designed to man-
age risk arising from these loans. These criteria anticipated
those used by the FHA, producing similar racially disparate ef-
fects. The HOLC originated neighborhood rankings, although it
identified preference levels with colors in addition to letters,
produced "residential security maps" that excluded specific
neighborhoods, and evaluated neighborhoods based on factors
that included racial homogeneity, amenities, economic stability
and location. 51
The HOLC had a major - and racially disparate - impact on
the housing market. During its existence, it received applica-
tions for loan assistance that accounted for about 40% of the
one to four family properties that carried mortgage debt from
June 1933 to June 1935. It ultimately refinanced about 20% of
all outstanding mortgages on owner-occupied properties.52
49 The HOLC was established by the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 (Pub.
L. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128) and was enacted June 13, 1933.
50 Jackson, supra note 38, at 419-52.
51 See, e.g., Amy. E. Hillier, Residential Security Maps and Neighborhood
Appraisals: The Home Owners' Loan Corporation and the Case of Philadel-
phia, 29 Soc. Sci. HIST. 207-233 (Vol. 2 2005). It is worth noting that an
alphabetic system of ratings was used- at least in Chicago- prior to the
HOLC. A realtor interviewed by the Chicago Commission on Race Relations
for their 1924 study of the Chicago Riot, for example, said that most Negro
properties "were in the C or D class." Supra note 22, at 158.
52 Kent W. Colton, Housing Finance in the United States: The Transforma-
tion of the US Housing Finance System 4 (Joint Center for Housing Studies,
Working Paper No. W02-5, 2002), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/re
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Overall, Blacks received only about 5% of HOLC issued
mortgages. 53
A focus on the HOLC as a source of the FHA's discrimina-
tory requirements leaves two unanswered questions: (1) Why
did the HOLC develop and employ these criteria in the first
place?; and (2) Why did the FHA choose to incorporate them?
I suggest that a partial answer to this question can be found in
the financial and legal environment within which the FHA oper-
ated. This environment was characterized by a connection be-
tween race and risk that created two reasons to incorporate
racially disparate criteria. First, the FHA could meet its goal of
expanding home ownership only if it secured the participation of
financial institutions, which accepted the race/risk connection.
Second, this construction of racial risk suggested that the
Agency endangered its own resources by extensive lending to
Blacks.
The importance of securing the participation of financial insti-
tutions was demonstrated by the fate of the first federal pro-
gram to intervene in mortgage markets in order to increase
ownership opportunities. The Federal Home Loan Bank was
created at the initiative of Herbert Hoover by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act (Pub.L. 72-304,47 Stat. 725), which was enacted
on July 22, 1932. The Federal Home Loan Bank Act (FHLBA)
was intended to provide funds to savings and loan associations
to increase their liquidity, allowing them to expand mortgage
lending.
Herbert Hoover laid out its mission in a 1932 letter to the
editor of the Ladies Home Journal: "The broad purpose is to
provide for the home owner a comparable background of stable
search/publications/housing-finance-united-states-transformation-us-housing-
finance-system.
53 CHRISTOPHER BONASTIA, KNOCKING ON THE DOOR: THE FEDERAL Gov-
ERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO DESEGREGATE THE SUBURBS (2010). This figure,
of course, was two percentage points higher than the share of mortgages
granted to Blacks under the FHA.
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credit with that we have already provided nationally for the bus-
iness man through the Federal Reserve Banks and for the
farmer through the Farm Loan Banks and the Intermediate
Credit Banks. The plan and method is not to engage the new
institutions in the business of providing direct loans but to give
impulse, security and safety and lower interest rates to the al-
ready existing institutions, especially the mutual institutions in
order that they may extend the fullest measure of credit to
would-be home owners." 54 The institution was eventually given
authority to make direct loans.55
The FHLBA's mission was not accomplished. The Act had
virtually no effect on the expansion of ownership because mem-
ber banks did not alter their accustomed lending criteria, and
because very few savings and loans applied for funds. In the first
two years of operation, 41,000 applications were received and 4
loans were approved.5 6 This failure demonstrated the impor-
tance of securing the co-operation of private financial institu-
tions in state attempts to expand ownership. The failure of this
first attempt to construct state intervention into the markets for
home finance suggested that obtaining this co-operation would
require close attention to the way in which these institutions as-
sessed risk and constructed lending requirements57
54 Letter from Herbert Hoover (May 13, 1932) (on file with Hoover
Library).
55 DAVID L. MASON, FROM BUILDINGS AND LOANS TO BAIL-OUTS (2004).
56 Jackson, supra note 11.
57 Gordon, for example, points out that the development of federal pro-
grams to insure lending required both the negotiation of many agreements
with financial institutions and the reworking of existing regulations. Adam
Gordon, The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in Bank-
ing Regulations Simultaneously Made Homeownership More Accessible to
Whites and Out of Reach for Blacks 115 YALE L. J. 186 (2005).
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EXPANDED OWNERSHIP AND THE MANAGEMENT
OF POLITICAL RISK
The FHLB was intended to provide concrete support for a
national agenda around the expansion of ownership that begun
in the period around World War I. This initial effort to extend
ownership, which has received less attention than that, which oc-
curred after World War 11,58 was initiated by concerns that lim-
ited access to ownership might create a majority of citizens who
had little attachment to the institution of private property and
by the belief that home ownership created a citizenry with a
bricks and mortar interest in social, economic and political sta-
bility. It was, in brief, intended to manage political risks created
by specific historical circumstances.
Concerns about stability and potential threats to capitalism
resulted from international and domestic challenges: the Bol-
shevik revolution in Russia and fear that the movement was
spreading in the United States;59 the growth of radical unionism;
waves of urban riots in 1919,60 and particularly the Chicago
Riot61 ; and, the persistence of business cycles.62 Concerns about
the spread of Bolshevism and radical unionism led to a desire to
increase the share of citizens who had a concrete interest in the
institution of private property. Workers of both races, Blacks in
particular, were identified as targets for Communist organizing.
58 See, e.g., James Greer, The Better Homes Movement and the Origins of
Mortgage Redlining in the United States (2013), in STATEBUILDING FROM THE
MARGINS-BETWEEN RECONSTRUCTION AND THE NEW DEAL 203-36 (Carol
Nackenoff and Julie Novkov ed. 2013); and Lawrence Vale, The Ideological
Origins of Affordable Home Ownership Efforts, in CHASING THE AMERICAN
DREAM: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON AFFORDABLE HOME OWNERSHIP 15-40
(William Rohe and Harry Watson, eds. 2007).
59 See generally, GEORGE WHITEFIELD MEAD, THE GREAT MENACE (1920).
60 CAMERON MCWHIRTER, RED SUMMER (Henry Holt ed. 2011).
61 Supra note 22.
62 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S CONF. ON HOME BUILDING AND HOME OWNER-
SHIP, REP. OF THE COMM'S ON HOME OWNERSHIP, INCOME AND TYPES OF
DWELLINGS 14-17 (James M. Gries & James Ford, eds. 1932).
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Congressional hearings and political and popular discourse reit-
erated the theme that Blacks and union members were fodder
for Bolshevik organizers.63 "Reds Try to Stir Negroes to Re-
volt," read one 1919 New York Times headline; "Radical Propa-
ganda among Negroes Growing," and "Negroes of the World
Prey of Agitators; Campaign, Backed by Bolsheviki and IWW Is
Opened for Self-Determination," warned others.64 The persis-
tence of business cycles provided an impetus to extend owner-
ship in order to ramp up and stabilize the construction and
related home goods industries. The intensive investigation of
the bloody Chicago Riot of 1919, which included extensive so-
cial scientific analysis, found that areas with high rates of owner-
ship experienced less violence.65
Reflecting these concerns, political discourse connected ex-
panded ownership with the national interest. The Republican
Party Platform of 1920 summed up this interest: "A nation of
home owners is the best guaranty of the maintenance of those
principles of liberty, law and order upon which our government
is founded. '66 In 1922, Calvin Coolidge opined, "It is of little
avail to assert that there is an inherent right to own property
unless there is an open opportunity that this right may be en-
joyed to a fair degree by all. That which is referred to in such
critical terms as capitalism cannot prevail unless it is adapted to
the general requirements. Unless it is of the people, it will cease
to have a place under our institutions, even as slavery ceased." 67
In the same year Herbert Hoover echoed these concerns: "The
63 See, e.g., Bolshevik Propaganda: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the
Comm. on the S. Judiciary, 66th Cong. (1919)..
64 See, Reds Try to Stir Negroes to Revolt, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,1919, at 1;
Radical Propaganda among Negroes Growing, N.Y. TIMES, October 5.,1919,
at 1; Negroes of World Prey of Agitators, N.Y. TIMES, August 24, 1919, at 1.
65 Supra note 22.
66 Political Party Platforms, Parties Receiving Electoral Votes: 1840-2012,
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (JUNE 12, 1928), http://www.presiden
cy.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29637 (last visited January 15, 2015).
67 Calvin Coolidge, A Nation of Home-Owners, THE DELINEATOR, October
1922, at 16-17.
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average individual is influenced by his way of life, by his envi-
ronment and it does not seem at all unlikely that if the propor-
tion of non-home owners becomes so great that legislation is
enacted at the behest of a majority of voters, it will be inimical
to private property rights. . .a nation of majority government
should be a nation of majority home owners." 68
From the perspective of national policy, these concerns had
two implications. First, they implied that the most appropriate
targets for extended ownership would be two groups who were
excluded by the practices of private financial institutions:
Blacks, who were disadvantaged by race and were dispropor-
tionately represented among lower-waged workers; and working
and lower middle-class Whites. Paradoxically, they also implied
that this extension had to be accomplished in a way that would
preserve the private character of ownership, that is, by incen-
tivizing private finance rather than providing direct government
funding for property purchasers. In the long term, this strategy
was expected to reduce state intervention in housing markets:
"We have ample evidence," Herbert Hoover wrote in 1931,
"that too great reliance on rented dwellings tends in the modern
industrial state to inadequate housing and the demand for state
participation in housing." 69
Early attempts to develop a national role in housing finance
to facilitate expanded ownership included consideration of bar-
riers to Black ownership. The 1931 Conference on Home Build-
ing and Home Ownership called by President Herbert Hoover,
for instance, reported on the work of 31 committees that had
spent a year examining the existing state of home ownership.
One of these committees, the Committee on Negro Housing, re-
ceived the second-highest level of funding and produced a 273
Volume 8, Number I
68 AMERICAN BUILDING ASSOCIATION NEWS, HOME OWNERSHIP ASSURES
SAFE GOVERNMENT, 42 SAVINGS AND LOAN NEWS 106, (1922).
69 BLANCHE HALBERT, THE BETTER HOMES MANUAL 3 (1931).
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page report that identified difficulties with property finance as
the major barrier to Black home ownership. 70
The FHLB itself was presented as one way to address this dif-
ficulty. The Atlanta Daily World, a newspaper aimed at a Black
audience, laid out this argument: "The creation of the federal
home loan bank board and the throwing of the wheels of the
home Loan bank under federal auspices will prove a tremen-
dous boon to the many thousands of Negro home and property
owners because its underlying objective is to help the smaller
man in his dire needs and desires to liquidate his resources into
cash. The injection of this provision which allows on loans on
valuations in excess of twenty thousand dollars is the final stim-
ulus which will bring the advantages of this new board within
the reach of the Negro people since the main body of the Race
has just about an average of that sum to realize upon while the
mass of Negroes in the country represent the nation's smaller
group as indicted in the definition of the Home Loan Bank Act,
which was passed by Congress and signed by President Hoover
on July 22."' 7 Both Black and White authorities suggested that
Blacks should be included on the Board of this institution, al-
though this never occurred. 72
The discussion above suggests that attempts to expand the
home ownership state were partially triggered and structured by
the idea that expanded ownership would create a citizenry with
a concrete interest in the institution of private property and
would also create conditions for increased social, economic and
political stability. The financing practices of lending institutions
were uniformly identified as a major barrier to expanded owner-
70 CHARLES S. JOHNSON, NEGRO HOUSING: REPORT OF THE COMM. ON NE-
GRO HOUSING (John M. Cries & James Ford, eds.1932). However, the rec-
ommendations of the Negro Housing Committee that suggested action to
overcome barriers to Black ownership were not adopted in the final report of
the Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership.
71 T.W. Anderson, Federal Loan Bank Board to Aid Home Owners, Prrrs-
BURGH COURIER, August 23, 1932, at 3.
72 Jackson, supra note 11, at 90.
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ship, but direct national intervention in home finance smacked
of the socialism that it was intended to prevent. As the failure of
the FHLB demonstrated, national policies could incentivize but
could not compel lender participation. Therefore, federal lend-
ing programs could succeed only if they operated within the par-
adigm accepted by lending institutions, a paradigm that included
existing constructions of racialized risk.
RACE AND RISK IN FINANCE AND LAW
Neither the HOLC nor the FHA originated the idea that the
financial risks arising from race were more severe than those
arising from class alone. Both agencies operated within a finan-
cial and legal environment that had institutionalized two no-
tions. First, although the financial risks arising from race
typically included those arising from class, racial risks were con-
strued to be much more complex and potentially much more se-
rious. Second, these risks could be summed up by the idea that
Black residence lowered property values. 73 HOLC and later
FHA lending criteria attempted to quantify these racial risks
both in order to secure the co-operation of financial institutions
and in order to conserve Agency resources. This was particularly
necessary because Agency requirements regarding the restruc-
turing of mortgages-that is, extended duration and lower inter-
est rates and down payment requirements-increased the risks
arising from class.
Class played a part in the assessments of racial risk. Black
workers were, as a group, likely to have lower and less secure
incomes than Whites. Describing racial barriers to home owner-
ship, the 1921 report of the Chicago Civil Rights Commission,
which conducted an extensive interviews of bank officials and
73 Light, however, suggests that as FHA criteria evolved, more complicated
constructions of locational risk developed, so that a more complex scheme
that took ethnicity into account came to be used to determine locational risk
in urban areas. Jennifer S. Light, Nationality and Neighborhood Risk at the
Origins of FHA Underwriting, 36 J. OF URBAN HIST. 634-371 (2010).
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realtors as part of its study of the Chicago Riot of 1919, noted
that "The Negro population of America, due to factors in its
history, constitutes at present a considerable proportion of the
familiar low-income group families and, in like manner, has in
its own composition a larger proportion of families of this level
than is true of other groups of the population."'74 Black employ-
ment was believed to be less secure than that of Whites: a survey
of Chicago lenders found that most shared the belief that "if
wage reductions become general they will fall most heavily on
unskilled workers and render difficult the meeting of payments
by such Negroes, who constitute the great majority."' 75 Race
and class interacted to create a circumstance in which, the Chi-
cago Riot Commission Report noted "how the Negro is to be
financed in his effort to improve his citizenship and home life
through home ownership . becomes a matter of great
concern. "76
However, race posed specific additional risks. In its final re-
port to the 1931 National Conference on Home Building and
Home Ownership, the Committee on Negro Housing listed
eleven factors that distinguished difficulties with improving
Black ownership and housing opportunities from those involved
with expanding opportunities for Whites:
"1. The course of selection and segregation
that, almost without exception, draws the Negro
population into the most deteriorated residence
sections of the city. This is in part the process of
city growth, in part economic selection and segre-
gation, and in part racial selection, the tendency to
compactness and group solidarity. This is enforced
in part from without and in part from within.
74 CHI. COMM'N ON RACE RELATIONS, supra note 22, at 221.
75 Id. at 223.
76 Id. at 83.
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2. The accelerated rate of deterioration inher-
ent in the character of Negro properties, due to
age and use.
3. The depreciation of property values attrib-
uted to Negro occupancy or proximity. This is in
part economic and in part psychological.
4. Segregation legislation designed to restrict
areas of residence as a public measure.
5. Restrictive compacts and covenants, de-
signed to restrict areas of Negro residence as a pri-
vate measure.
6. Objection of White residents to the presence
of Negroes in certain areas, as registered in:(a)
Clashes, (b) Bombings of property, and (c)
Intimidation.
7. Exclusion of the Negroes from new housing
developments.
8. Limitation of facilities for financing of Negro
home ownership.
9. Increased rentals with Negro occupancy.
10. Factors related to the level of culture of the
majority population of the Negro group, as re-
flected in the care of property.
11. The relation of such physical factors as ex-
cessive congestion, and physical deterioration to
correspondingly excessive rates of delinquency
and mortality in Negro areas." 77
These characteristics can be partially understood as a cata-
logue of racial risks arising both from individual behavior and
from neighborhood characteristics. These risks fall into three
categories. First, both the residences of individual Blacks and
Black neighborhoods were poorly maintained and prone to ac-
77 Supra note 62.
Volume 8, Number 1 Winter 2OI1-
23
Tillotson: Race, Risk and Real Estate: The Federal Housing Administration an
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DePaul Journal for Social Justice +8
celerated deterioration, making them unsuitable for investment.
Second, high rates of Black residence were associated with ele-
vated rates of violence, crime, delinquency, and other social
problems that affected investment values. Third, in an environ-
ment characterized by geographic restrictions on Black occu-
pancy, conditions were almost certain to deteriorate, further
reducing property values and affecting longer-term returns.
The notion that Black residence produced declining property
values did not originate with the HOLC or with the FHA.
HOLC and FHA housing assessment grids reflected existing un-
derstandings of real estate investment and appraisal practices.78
HOLC and FHA evaluation criteria were partially developed by
Frederick Babcock, author of a classic 1932 text, The Valuation
of Real Estate. Chapter VII of this text was devoted to a discus-
sion of "Influence of Social and Racial Factors on Value." He
noted that while small degrees of neighborhood heterogeneity
did not produce rapid declines in value, "[t]here is one differ-
ence in people, namely race, which results in a very rapid
decline. "79
Other contemporary studies of land values and valuation
practices took a similar view of the connection between race and
property value. In his 1933 study One Hundred Years of Land
Values in Chicago, Homer Hoyt notes that "land values in areas
occupied by certain racial and national groups are invariably low
because of the lower rents that these groups pay, their greater
deteriorating effects on property, and white people's unwilling-
ness to live near them." He then cites a rating system developed
by a Chicago real estate broker that presents a numeric scale
connecting neighborhood ethnicity and property values: neigh-
borhoods in which English residents predominated ranked high-
78 Charles L. Nier III, The Shadow of Credit: The Historical Origins of Ra-
cial Predatory Lending and Its Impact Upon African American Wealth Ac-
cumulation, 11 U. PA. J. L. & Soc. CHANGE 131, 178 (2013).
79 FREDERICK M. BABCOCK, THE VALUATION OF REAL ESTATE IN THE
UNITED STATES 9 (1932).
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est of the 10 categories. Those in which Blacks settled were
ranked 9th, followed only by those that had Mexican residentsS 0
Negative attributions about the condition of properties occu-
pied by Blacks were also common among lenders and realtors.
For example, a realtor told the Chicago Commission on Race
Relations, "For the most part the physical surroundings of the
Negro family, as indicated by these family histories, are
poor.. .The ordinary conveniences, considered necessities by the
average white citizen, are often lacking. Bathrooms are often
missing. Gas lighting is common, and electric lighting is a rarity.
Heating is commonly done by wood or coal stoves, and furnaces
are rather exceptional." 8' These difficulties were also connected
to financial mismanagement by Black owners. Another lender,
for example, told the Chicago Commission, "[m]any Negroes
purchased fairly substantial dwellings on the long-time instal-
ment [sic] plan without providing for repairs and
maintenance." 82
The FHA's requirement that evaluators examine surrounding
neighborhoods to determinate the possibility of "invasion" or
"infiltration" by other racial groups echoed the recommenda-
tions of standard appraisal authorities of the day. McMichael's
1931 text, for example, described the process of deterioration
that transformed neighborhoods into "twilight" or "blighted"
zones," noting as a primary cause "invasion by incompatible
uses" such as "social or racial changes." 83
Understandings about the relationship of race and property
value were also embedded in the legal order, further legitimiz-
ing the connection between Black residence and lowered prop-
80 HOMER HOYT, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LAND VALUES IN CHICAGO 13
(1933).
81 Supra note 22, at 152.
82 Id. at 200.
83 STANLEY MCMICHAEL, MCMICHAEL'S APPRAISING MANUAL: A REAL
ESTATE APPRAISING HANDBOOK FOR FIELD WORK AND ADVANCED STUDY
COURSES (1931).
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erty values. 84 From around 1920, extensive litigation around
restrictive covenants both reflected and legitimized the connec-
tion.85 The majority of decisions upholding covenants typically
held that they served a legitimate public purpose - that of main-
taining the value of covered properties.s6 On the other hand,
successful challenges to covenants most often relied on the doc-
trine of "changed circumstances," which held that if the purpose
of a covenant had been frustrated by changes in external cir-
cumstances, it could be voided.8 7 The legal theory presented by
these cases was that the influx of Blacks into areas surrounding
the restricted properties had already reduced their value, frus-
trating their purpose.88 In the 1944 case of Fairchild v. Raines,
for example, the California Supreme Court relied on testimony
of local residents, including a physician and a real estate agent,
to find that the purpose of the covenant had been frustrated be-
cause "the damage occasioned that neighborhood by negro oc-
cupancy had already been sustained by reason of the influx of
Negroes... in the same tract." 89
The connection between race and reduced values was also in-
corporated into official understandings of property law. In 1944,
the American Law Institute issued a revised edition of its Re-
statement of Property. These periodic Restatements were in-
84 Amanda Tillotson, Property as Theft: Restrictive Covenants and Racial-
ized Property Rights before Shelley v. Kraemer (unpublished student
work)(on file with author).
85 See e.g., CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT,
THE NAACP AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES (1959) and Clement
E. Vose, NAACP Strategy in the Covenant Cases, 6 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
101 (1955). Hundreds of court cases that challenged to restrictive covenants
were conducted by the NAACP and a few private attorneys before the deci-
sion in Shelley v. Kraemer.
86 See, CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE
NAACP AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES (1959).
87 David Delaney, Geographies of Judgment: The Doctrine of Changed Con-
ditions and the Geopolitics of Race, 83 ANNALS OF THE ASS'N OF AM. GEOG-
RAPHERS 1, 48-65 (1993).
88 Supra note 18, at 47.
89 Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal. 2d 818, 823 (Cal. 1944).
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tended to communicate current understandings about best
practices in property law. As part of the ALI's continuing at-
tempt to harmonize apparently contradictory rules of common
and case law, this restatement attempted to provide an authori-
tative resolution to an apparent contradiction: both in terms of
common law and in settled case law, a critical element of owner-
ship was the right of owners to dispose of - or alienate - prop-
erty as they saw fit. Exceptions were warranted only if they met
compelling state interests. The revised Restatement held that de-
spite their substantial impact on the issue of alienation, restric-
tive covenants were warranted by the compelling need to
stabilize property values and to alleviate social tensions.90
CONCLUSION: THE FHA AND RACIAL RISK
As this discussion has demonstrated, the FHA was created in
a financial and legal environment that was pervaded by a racial-
ized notion of risk. The FHA did not originate the notion that
race exacerbated lending risks, but it legitimized and repro-
duced these understandings at a critical period in the history of
American home ownership. The Agency's role in promoting ra-
cial ownership disparities in the period after World War II was
well-known at the time, drawing criticism from Black organiza-
tions such as the NAACP and the Urban League, 91 from Black
newspapers such as the Chicago Defender,92 and from Civil
Rights advocates within the federal government, including the
Committee on Civil Rights created by President Truman.93
90 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY
(1944).
91 PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DRAFT OF REPORT ON HOUSING
56 (HARRY S TRUMAN LIBRARY, RG 220, 1941-1947)
92 Harry McAlpin, Race Relations Setup in U.S. Housing Agency Still Re-
mains a Question Mark. THE CHICAGO DEFENDER (1943).
93 Supra note 91. See also, Louis HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY
OF AMERICA IN RED INK (2011).
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FHA responses to these challenges, however, demonstrated
the Agency's deep attachment to racialized lending practices. As
I have noted above, while state action to enforce restrictive cov-
enants was enjoined by Shelley v. Kraemer in 1947, the FHA
recommended the use of covenants until 1950, continuing a
practice that aimed specifically to stabilize investment values
and reduce lender risk.
The Agency's attempts to manage criticism also included an
institutional change designed to take account of regional differ-
ences in understandings about the connections among race, risk
and property. In 1946, the Agency established a race relations
service to provide assistance in addressing minority issues, but
this development occurred in the context of a transition to "de-
centralized management" that employed regional race relations
specialists to "harmonize" FHA policies with local racial hous-
ing practices, allowing local constructions of racial risk to shape
the implementation of federal ownership policies.94 In sum, the
FHA's efforts in the post-World War II period re-shaped and
reinforced existing connections among race, property and risk.
94 Memorandum from Frank Horne, Special Assistant to the Housing and
Home Finance Agency Administrator (HHFA), on Minority Group Consid-
erations in the Administration of Governmental Housing Programs to the
HHFA Staff (June 20, 1947) (on file with the Harry S. Truman Library).
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